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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH

:

Plaintiff/Appellee

:

vs.
BRENT W. TIMMERMAN,
Defendants/Appellants

Ct. App. No. 20011022-CA
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a finding of guilty by a jury on November 20, 2001, and
from the Court's denial of the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence. The
Defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance, a second
degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. He
was sentenced on the same day to an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years at
the Utah State Prison and six months in the county jail which were to run
concurrent to each other, but consecutive to another prison
December 18, 2001, the Defendant filed a notice of appeal.

sentence.

On

This Court has

jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2002).

ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
WAS THE DEFENDANT DETAINED WITHOUT REASONABLE
SUSPICION WHEN OFFICER DIXON TOOK HIS DRIVER'S
LICENSE AND RAN A WARRANTS CHECK ON HIM?
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The trial court's determination of reasonable

suspicion should be reviewed for correctness. See, State v. Galvan 37 P.3d 1197,
1198 (Utah Ct. App. 2001).

The trial court's factual findings underlying its

decision to deny a motion to suppress should be reviewed under a clearly
erroneous standard of review. See, State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 n. 4 (Utah
1994). This issue was preserved when the Defendant's attorney filed a motion to
suppress the evidence (R. 021-24).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Fourth Amendment - The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(e)(2002).- Court of Appeals Jurisdiction(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
conviction or charge of a first-degree felony or capital felony;

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Defendant was charged by Information with possession of a controlled
substance with a prior conviction, a second-degree felony, possession of drug
2

paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, and no registration, a class C misdemeanor.
(R. 001). Defendant's trial attorney filed a motion to suppress the evidence against
the Defendant. (R. 021-24). The State responded with an objection to Defendant's
motion. (R. 026-033). A suppression hearing was held in front of the Honorable
Stanton Taylor on October 16, 2001. (R. 035).

The Defendant's motion to

suppress was denied. (R. 041). A jury trial was held on November 20, 2001. The
Defendant was found guilty of the charges. (R. 053-54). He was sentenced on the
same day as the trial to a term of one to fifteen years at the Utah State prison. (R.
054).
The Sentence, Judgment and Commitment was signed on December 14,
2001. (R7 110-113). A notice of appeal was filed on December 18, 2001. (R.
107).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On August 1, 2001, Justin Dixon, an officer with the Ogden Police
Department was on patrol at approximately 3:00 a.m. He noticed a truck that was
pulled to the side of the road. The lights weren't on and the door was open. The
driver was "kind of half hanging" out the door and he was working on something
under the dash. (R. 117/2). Officer Dixon pulled up behind the vehicle. (R.
117/3). He had his high beam headlights on but he didn't activate the overhead
lights. (R. 117/4).

3

Officer Dixon testified that he hadn't observed any violations of the law. (R.
117/3). His reason for stopping behind the Defendant's vehicle was to "see if they
were okay, see if they needed any help." (R. 117/4). Officer Dixon spoke with the
Defendant who told him that his dash lights had gone out. Officer Dixon could see
that Defendant was "messing with the wires of the fuse box under the dashboard."
(R. 117/5).
Officer Dixon had noticed that the vehicle had Iowa license plates. He
asked the Defendant where he was from and he answered Huntsville. (R. 117/5).
Officer Dixon asked the Defendant who the truck belonged to. The Defendant
initially said he didn't know and then he answered that it was a friends. (R. 117/5).
The Defendant told Officer Dixon that a friend bought it from a lady and the friend
was letting him use it.

(R. 117/5). Officer Dixon couldn't remember if the

Defendant told him his friend's first name.

(R. 117/10).

He also couldn't

remember if the Defendant gave him a phone number to verify who the owner was.
(R. 117/10).
Officer Dixon asked the Defendant for his driver's license and the
registration so he could make sure that everything with the truck was okay. (R.
117/5). The Defendant couldn't find the paperwork on the vehicle but he did give
Officer Dixon his driver's license.

(R. 117/6).

Officer Dixon ordered the

Defendant to stay in the vehicle while Officer Dixon took the Defendant's license
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back to his police vehicle. (R. 117/6). Officer Dixon learned that the vehicle
wasn't stolen and that Defendant's license was valid. (R. 117/6). He also ran a
warrants check on the Defendant and learned that he had a felony warrant for his
arrest. (R. 117/6).
The Defendant was arrested on the warrant. (R. 117/6). Officer Dixon had
another officer search the Defendant's vehicle incident to arrest. He also did an
inventory of the vehicle before they impounded it. (R. 117/7). During the search
of the vehicle, Officer Grogan found three small baggies which tested positive for
methamphetamine. He also found some glass pipes and a plastic scale. (R. 117/7).
These items were found on the middle of the seat. (R. 117/7). There was a female
passenger-in the vehicle. She told the officers that the methamphetamine was not
hers. (R. 117/8). Officer Dixon then spoke with the Defendant. He told the
Defendant that he was going to charge them both with it and that if it wasn't the
female's he should tell him so she wouldn't get charged with it. (R. 118/78). The
Defendant said "If she doesn't get charged, it's mine. (R. 118/78). He then said,
"no, I want to talk to my attorney." (R. 117/9).
Judge Taylor was not concerned with the Defendant's detention.

He

referred to it as being "of no consequence." (R. 117/25). Judge Taylor took the
matter under advisement, but it was only to consider the constitutional issues
surrounding the warrant that was issued by the Board of Pardons. (R. 117/25-28).

5

The trial judge issued a written decision. In the written decision the Court
found that the Defendant lived in Utah but was driving an out-of-state vehicle and
he was unable to give the full name of the owner of the vehicle. The Court found
that based on these facts, the officer did a license and warrant check on the
Defendant

and

that

these

actions

were professionally

responsible

and

constitutionally permissible. (R. 041).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendant was detained when Officer Dixon took his driver's license
and ran a warrants check on him. Officer Dixon detained the Defendant without
being able to point to specific articuable facts that would lead a reasonable person
to believe that the Defendant was engaged in criminal activity.

Since the

Defendant was illegally detained, the evidence which was found following said
detention should have been suppressed by the trial court.
ARGUMENT
THE DEFENDANT WAS DETAINED WITHOUT REASONABLE
SUSPICION WHEN OFFICER DIXON TOOK HIS DRIVER'S
LICENSE AND RAN A WARRANTS CHECK ON HIM.
The Fourth Amendment to the Untied States Constitution protects "[t]he right
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend. IV. Even though the

6

Defendant was not driving his vehicle at the time of his detention this case is
analogous to a regular traffic stop.
Before a police officer can detain a citizen he needs an articulable suspicion
"that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime;" State v. Markland,
84 P.3d 240, 241 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). The State has the burden of establishing
those articulable facts. See, State v. Kohl, 999 P.2d 7, 12 (Utah 2000).
In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion, courts should
"look to the totality of the circumstances . . . to determine if there was an objective
basis for suspecting criminal activity." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141
(Utah Ct. App. 1997). When considering the totality of the circumstances the
officer's-conduct should be judged "in light of common sense and ordinary human
experience . . . and we accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish
between innocent and suspicious actions." United States v. Williams, 111 F.3d
1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001).
Reasonable suspicion must also be judged against an objective standard.
This Court must consider "whether there were specific and articulable facts known
to the officer, which taken together with rational inferences from these facts,
created a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify intrusion into the
defendant's personal security." State v. Friesen, 988 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct. App.
1999).

7

In the case at bar, the encounter between Officer Dixon and the Defendant
started out as a level one encounter.

A level one encounter "is a voluntary

encounter where a citizen may respond to an officer's inquiries but is free to leave
at any time." State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Defendant was parked on the side of the road trying to fix his dashboard
lights when Officer Dixon pulled his vehicle behind the Defendant's truck to see if
he was okay and if he needed help. (R. 117/4). Officer Dixon had not observed
any violations of the law. (R. 117/3). During the encounter Officer Dixon asked
Defendant where he was from and the Defendant answered, "Huntsville." Officer
Dixon had noticed that the truck had Iowa plates so he asked the Defendant who
owned the-truck. (R. 117/5).
Defendant initially told Officer Dixon that he didn't know and then told him
the truck was a friend's and that he was letting him use it. (R. 117/5). On crossexamination, Officer Dixon testified that he couldn't remember what the
Defendant had told him. The following colloquy took place between Defendant's
attorney and Officer Dixon.
Q.

And when he gives you his name and tells you he lives in Huntsville,
what other facts do you have to believe the vehicle is stolen at that
time?

8

A.

Well, he didn't know, couldn't tell me who the registered owner was.
He wouldn't tell me his exact friend's name.

Q.

Did he tell you his first name?

A.

I don't remember.

Q.

Did he tell you the phone number to verify who the owner was?

A.

I don't remember.

Q.

He could have done that, right?

A.

Possibly.

(R. 117/10).

At this point, the level one encounter escalated to a level two

detention. Officer Dixon asked the Defendant for his driver's license and the
registration to the vehicle so he could "make sure that everything with the truck
was okay." (R. 117/5).

The Defendant couldn't find the "paperwork" on the

vehicle and only gave Officer Dixon his driver's license. (R. 117/6).

Officer

Dixon had the Defendant wait in his vehicle while he ran a check for warrants. He
also ran an NCIC check on the vehicle. Officer Dixon learned that the vehicle
wasn't stolen, but that the Defendant had a warrant for his arrest. (R. 117/6).
It is well settled that when an officer takes an individual's identification and
runs a warrants check that a detention has occurred. In State v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274
(Utah Ct. App. 2000), this Court addressed a situation where two officers were
engaged in a level one encounter with the defendant. One of the officers took the
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defendant's identification and ran a warrants check. While the officer was running
the warrants check, the second officer continued to question the defendant and
asked for consent to search her bag. During the search of the bag the officer found
paraphernalia. Id. at 276. This Court stated that;
Given the totality of the circumstances, it is clear that a reasonable
person in Ray's position would not feel free to just walk away,
thereby abandoning her identification, let alone to approach Officer
Eldard, take back her identification, and then leave. Instead, Officer
Eldard's retention of her identification during the warrant check
sufficiently restrained Ray's freedom that she was seized for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 278. When the encounter turned to a level two detention, Officer Dixon is
required to be able to point to specific articulable facts to support the detention.
"In determining whether this objective standard has been met, the focus necessarily
centers upon the facts known to the officer immediately before the stop." State v.
Fnese/i, 988P.2dat 10.
In the case at bar, Officer Dixon knew that Defendant lived in Huntsville,
Utah, but that he was driving a car that had Iowa plates on it. Officer Dixon
testified that the Defendant originally told him that he didn't know who the truck
belonged to and then said it was a friend's.

However, Officer Dixon couldn't

remember if Defendant gave him a name and phone number of the friend who
owned the car. Also, when Officer Dixon asked for the Defendant's driver's
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license and registration the Defendant was not able to produce the registration for
the vehicle.
Based on the above facts, Officer Dixon detained the Defendant so he could
"make sure everything was okay with the car." (R. 117/5). If Officer Dixon was
really concerned that the truck was stolen he could have very easily and nonintrusively given dispatch the license number and had dispatch do a NCIC check to
see if it was stolen. Instead, he detained the Defendant and ran a warrants check
on him.
Under the totality of the circumstances, Officer Dixon did not have
reasonable suspicion to detain the Defendant. In State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761
(Utah 199-1), the Supreme Court reversed the decision by this Court in State v.
Johnson, 111 P.2d 326 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In Johnson, a deputy sheriff noticed
a vehicle with faulty brake lights. Before he stopped the vehicle he ran a check on
the license plate and obtained the name of the registered owner. When the deputy
stopped the vehicle he asked the driver for her driver's license. The name on the
license was different than that of the registered owner. The deputy asked for
registration and the driver was unable to produce the registration. The deputy then
asked the defendant, who was a passenger, for identification, reasoning that with
no registration and no owner present, there was a possibility that the car was
stolen. Id. at 762
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The deputy returned to his car and ran a warrants check on the two
occupants of the car. The defendant had a warrant for her arrest. She was arrested
and her backpack was searched, producing paraphernalia and amphetamines. Id.
The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[w]hile the lack of a registration
certificate and the fact that the occupants did not own the car raised the possibility
that the car might be stolen, this information, without more, does not rise to the
level of an articulable suspicion that the car was stolen." Id. at 764. The Supreme
Court then quoted from Judge Orme's dissent where he stated that the "facts are
just as consistent with the more likely scenario that the driver borrowed the car
from its rightful owner." Id. {quoting, State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d at 328(dissenting
opinion)}: *
The Supreme Court noted that the deputy could have inquired about the
registered owner and how the occupants came into possession of the car. He also
did not check stolen car records to ascertain if the car had been reported stolen, nor
did he know of a report of a stolen vehicle matching that description. "Therefore,
the leap from asking for the passenger's name and date of birth to running a
warrants check on her severed the chain of rational inference from specific
articulable facts and degenerated into an attempt to support an as yet inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764 {quoting,
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)).
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The only possible distinguishing fact between Johnson and the case at bar is
that Officer Dixon testified that Defendant initially said he didn't know who the
truck belonged to and then said it was a friend's. (R. 117/5). However, when
pressed the officer couldn't remember whether the Defendant had given him a
name and phone number for the owner. (R. 117/10). The State has the burden for
establishing the articuable factual basis. Here, Officer Dixon was clearly unable to
do that.
As was the case in Johnson, Officer Dixon could have attempted to obtain
more information about the owner and he could have looked at the license plate
and ran an NCIC check to see if the vehicle was stolen. Instead, he took the
Defendant-s driver's license and ran a warrants check on him. This step severed
the "chain of rational inferences from specific and articulable facts and
degenerated into an attempt to support an . . . inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or hunch." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 764.
The State failed to meet its burden of showing specific articulable facts that
justified detaining the Defendant. For these reasons the Defendant respectfully
requests this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the
evidence.
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CONCLUSION
Officer Dixon escalated the level-one encounter into a level two detention
when he took the Defendant's license and ran a warrants check on him. Since
Office Dixon was unable to point to specific and articuable facts that would lead a
reasonable person to believe the vehicle was stolen. The contraband was found
following this illegal detention and therefore should have been suppressed as fruit
of the poisonous tree.
DATED this h_ day of November, 2004.

DEE W. SMITH
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Mark
Shurtliff Attorney General, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 160 East 300 South; 6th Floor
PO Box 140854 SLC, Utah 84114-0180, postage prepaid this _ day of
November, 2004.
LX^L
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DEE W. SMITH
Attorney at Law
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

mwm
JURY TRIAL
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 011903622 FS

BRENT W TIMMERMAN,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

STANTON M. TAYLOR
November 20, 2001

PRESENT
Clerk:
pama
Prosecutor: RICHARD A PARMLEY
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): PDA, MARTIN GRAVIS
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 16, 1960
Video
Tape Number:
T112 001
Tape Count: 9:15
CHARGES
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/20/2001 Guilty
2. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 11/20/2001 Guilty
TRIAL
This is the time set for jury trial. Attorney Richard Parmley is
present representing the State of Utah. Attorney Martin Gravis is
present representing the defendant, Brent W. Timmerman, who is
present.
Jury vore dire is held. Jury is selected.
Parties make opening statements.
State presents its case by calling witnesses Justin Dixon, Shawn
Groger, Christine Wright, and Tersa Malmberg. Witnesses are sworn
and testify.
State rests. Defense does not call any witnesses. Defense rests.
Jury instructed. Closing arguements made by each party. Jury
Page 1

Case No: 011903622
Date:
Nov 20, 2001
retires.
Jury returns with a verdict of guilty to both charges. Jury is
thanked and released.
Court has bifurcated the issue of defendant beening previously
convicted of a felony. State presents a certified copy of previous
conviction.
Defendant waives the time for sentencing and requests to be
sentenced today.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The prison sentence imposed on count I is to run concurrently to
the jail sentence imposed on count II but is to run consecutively
to the prison sentence the defendant is now serving.

SENTENCE JAIL
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to
a term of 180 day(s)

Page 2

Case No: 011903622
Date:
Nov 20, 2001
SENTENCE JAIL SERVICE NOTE
The jail sentence imposed on count II in this case is to be served
at the Utah State Prison. The jail sentence may run concurrently
to the prison sentence imposed on count I but consecutively to the
prison sentence the defendant is now serving.
Dated this

H" day of

IM—2-

20 £1/ y

^

STANTON M. TAYLOR
District Cour^t Judge
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ADDENDUM B

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OGDEN COURT, WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Case No. 011903622 FS

Plaintiff,

BRENT W. TIMMERMAN,
Defendant.

SUPPRESSION HEARING OCTOBER 16, 2001
BEFORE
THE HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR
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CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER
1775 East Ellen Way
Sandy, Utah 84092
801-523-1186

Ci^iK c»" *w"',o Court

cPoot/oaacA
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APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

RICHARD A. PARMLEY
Deputy County Attorney

For the Defendant:

MARTIN GRAVIS
Public Defender Association
* * *

INDEX
PAGE
WITNESS
JUSTIN DIXON
Direct Examination by Mr. Pamiley
Cross Examination by Mr. Gravis

1
9

1

WEBER COUNTY, UTAH; OCTOBER 16, 2001

2

HONORABLE STANTON M. TAYLOR PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4
5

THE COURT:

State vs. Timmerman.

Is the State ready

to proceed?

6

MR. PARMLEY:

7

the lengthy wait.

8

subpoenaed.

9

called his home.

Yes, Your Honor, and we apologize for

We called Officer Dixon's home.

He had been

We have a copy of the subpoena in our file.

We

He worked graveyards, was asleep but never

10

received the subpoena through OPD.

11

routed through OPD and we don't know what happened but he is

12

here now and I'm sorry for the wait.

13

THE COURT:

14

MR. PARMLEY:

We apologize.

It's all right.
Officer Dixon?

15

JUSTIN DIXON

16

having been duly sworn testified upon

17

his oath as follows:

18
19
20
21

They're

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. PARMLEY:
Q

Officer Dixon, will you tell us your full name

please?

22

A

Justin Dixon.

23

Q

And you work with the Ogden Police Department;

24

that right?

25

A

is

Yes.

1

1

Q

2

Department?

3

A

I work on the graveyard patrol shift.

4

Q

Were you on duty on August 1st of this year?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

And will you tell us about 3:00 or 3:15 in the

7

What is your assignment with the Ogden Police

morning, where you were?

8

A

I was out in the area of Pennsylvania Avenue and 2550

9

South.

10

Q

11

attention?

12

A

Yes, I did.

13

Q

What was it about this truck that drew your attention

14

to it?

15

A

Did you in that area see a truck that caught your

It was pulled to the side of the road.

It didn't

16

have any lights on and the driver door was open and the driver

17

was kind of half hanging out like he was working on' something

18

under the dash.

19

Q

Where was the truck on the road?

20

A

It was on the 24th Street 1-15 ramp which is right

21
22
23

there at 2550 South Pennsylvania.
Q

Is this a traveled portion of roadway where you saw

the vehicle or was it off to the side?

24

A

It was off to the side.

25

Q

Lights out, vehicle stopped, driver door open, driver
2

1

sort of hanging out the side of the car you said or out of the

2

side of the truck.

3

if it was shut off?

Could you see if the truck was running or

4

A

I couldn't tell.

5

Q

You were in your patrol car at this time; is that

6

right?

7

A

Yeah.

8

Q

And were you coming from behind or from the other

9

direction?

10

A

I was driving south on what's Pennsylvania Avenue.

11

So when I stopped at the stoplight and the occupants of the

12

vehicle were to my left.

13
14

Q

All right and then you turned onto the on-ramp

yourself?

15

A

Uh-huh (affirmative).

16

Q

Now were you - tell us exactly how you approached on

17
18

the on ramp, what it is you did.
A

As soon as the light turned green I turned and pulled

19

right behind the vehicle.

20

than my headlights were on.

21
22

Q

I just pulled up behind it.

At that point had you seen any violations of law or

anything?

23

A

No.

24

Q

Okay.

25

I didn't turn on any lights other

So you pulled up from behind the vehicle and

came to a stop?
3

1

A

Yeah.

2

Q

How close to the back of the truck did you park your

3

patrol car?

4

A

From probably me to you.

5

Q

Now were your headlights on?

6

A

Yes.

7

Q

Did you shut them off or did you leave them on?

8

A

No, I had them on and I'm sure I had the brights on.

9

Q

Okay.

10

But you didn't activate any overhead lights or

anything?

11

A

No.

12

Q

On the on ramp, if the vehicle had wanted to go

13

forward at that point, was there anything blocking their

14

ability to drive forward?

15

A

No.

16

Q

Please tell us exactly what you did after you had

17
18

brought your patrol car to a stop behind the truck.
A

I let the dispatcher know where I was and I let her

19

know that I was out on a vehicle that was pulled over to the

20

side of the road.

21

Q

What were you going to do at that point?

22

A

Just see if they were okay, see if they needed any

23

help.

24

Q

And how did you proceed from that point?

25

A

I just got out of my car, I walked up to the driver

1

which was Brent Timmerman.

2

was wrong.

3

when I got up there, I could see that he was messing with the

4

wires or the fuse box under the dashboard.

5

lights were out.

6

Iowa license plate on it so I asked him where he was from and

7

he said Huntsville.

8

valley there so I asked him who the truck belonged to and at

9

first he said he didn't know and then he said it was a

10
11

I asked him if he was okay and what

He said that his dashlights had just went out and

He told me that his

When I'd approached the car I noticed it had

I knew Hunstville was just up in the

friend's.
Q

You saw the Iowa plates, he said he was from

12

Hunstville, so you asked him at that point who the truck

13

belonged to?

14

A

Yes.

15

Q

And what was the reason for asking that?

16

A

Because I was wondering what the deal was with the

17

truck since it was registered out of Iowa and he lived in

18

Huntsville.

19

Q

What did he say?

20

A

Eventually he told me that it was a friend's, a

21

friend had bought it from a lady and the friend was letting him

22

use it.

23

license and the registration to the vehicle to make sure that

24

everything with the truck was okay.

25

Q

So then I asked him if I could see his driver's

Now what did the defendant say to you?

5

1
2
3
4
5

A

He couldn't find no paperwork on the vehicle and he

gave me his driver's license.
Q

Did you do any further checks to confirm or dispel

your concerns about that vehicle with Iowa plates?
A

Yeah, at that time I asked him to stay in the vehicle

6

because he had some screwdrivers and some other things that he

7

was working with so I went back to my vehicle and checked with

8

dispatch and they said that he had a warrant for a felony two,

9

no-bail warrant and his license was valid.

10
11

Q

So you verified he had a valid license but there were

two felony two warrants for his arrest?

12

A

Well, it was just a felony two warrant.

13

Q

A felony two warrant for his arrest.

14
15

anything about the vehicle with the Iowa plates?
A

I learned that it wasn't stolen.

16

to a lady named Jeanine out of Iowa.

17

stolen.

18
19

Did you learn

Q

It was registered

It wasn't reported

The name of the registration papers were with the

vehicle you said?

20

A

Yeah.

21

Q

What did you do once you had learned those three

22
23

things?
A

About this time another officer showed up and I went

24

up and I placed him under arrest for the warrant and brought

25

him back and put him in my car.

6

1
2
3

Q

After you had arrested him on the warrant, what did

you do with the vehicle?
A

I had the other officer search through it incident to

4

arrest and also do an inventory on the vehicle before we

5

impounded it and held it for safe keeping.

6

Q

Does OPD have an impound policy?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Did you follow the inventory and impound policy in

9

impounding this vehicle?

10

A

Yes.

11

Q

Are these circumstances which you would typically

12

impounded the vehicle?

13

A

Yes.

14

Q

What happened in the course of the search incident to

15
16

arrest and the impound and inventory of the vehicle?
A

Officer Grogen found three small baggies which field

17

tested positive for methamphetamine, also found some burnt

18

glass pipes and a plastic scale.

19

Q

Where were those items found?

20

A

On the seat, on the middle of the seat.

21

Q

Now, was anybody else in the vehicle besides the

22

driver, defendant?

23

A

Yes, one passenger, Amy Holtz, I think was her name.

24

Q

Did you have any discussion with the passenger or the

25

defendant after you'd found the baggies of suspected

7

1

methamphetamine and the pipes?

2

A

Yes.

I talked to Amy.

I asked her about the meth

3

and the paraphernalia.

4

returned to my patrol car where I advised Mr. Timmerman his

5

Miranda rights and then I told him that we had found the meth

6

and paraphernalia.

7
8

Q

I

After you had advised him of his rights, did you ask

him if he wanted to talk with you?

9
10

She said that it wasn't hers.

A

Yes.

He said he would talk to me and he said he

understood them.

11

Q

And what did you say at that time?

12

A

Then I let him know that we had found some

13

methamphetamine and paraphernalia, that if they were his, he

14

needed to let me know so maybe he didn't get charged with this

15

stuff.

16

Q

Did he say anything in response to that?

17

A

He said that they were his, if she doesn"t get

18

charged.

19
20

Q

Then he said, no, I want to talk to my attorney.
Okay.

What was, was they're mine if she doesn't get

charged?

21

A

Say that again.

22

Q

What were his words exactly?

23

A

I'd have to look in my report.

24

Q

All right.

25

Is that the report that you're referring

to?

8

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

Okay.

3

A

He said if she didn't get charged, then it's mine and

4

then he said, no, I want to talk to my attorney.

5

Q

Okay.

6

A

No.

7

10

Was there any further questions at that time?

MR. PARMLEY:

8
9

Does that refresh your memory?

That's all I have thank you.
CROSS EXAMINATION

BY MR. GRAVIS:
Q

So you told him that if he said it was his, she

11

wouldn't get charged, otherwise they were both getting charged,

12

right?

13

A

14
15
16

No.

I said if it wasn't hers then he should let me

know so she didn't get charged with his stuff.
Q

With his stuff?

So you had implied that he was going

to get charged irregardless of whether she got charged, right?

17

A

If you take it that way.

18

Q

Did you tell him it would be a shame if she got

19

charged, she was a cute little girl?

20

A

No.

21

Q

Okay.

22

working on it.

23

lived, correct?

You see the vehicle stopped and he's obviously
He gave you his name and told you where he

24

A

Yeah.

25

Q

Had you run the plates before?

9

1

A

No.

2

Q

Did you have any reasons to believe the vehicle was

3

stolen at that time?

4

A

What time?

5

Q

When you first pulled off and you see it's got Iowa

6

plates on it?

7

A

No.

8

Q

And when he gives you his name and tells you he lives

9
10
11

in Huntsville, what other facts do you have to believe the
vehicle is stolen at that time?
A

Well, he didn't know, couldn't tell me who the

12

registered owner was.

13

name.

He wouldn't tell me his exact friend's

14

Q

Did he tell you his first name?

15

A

I don't remember.

16

Q

Did he tell you the phone number to verify who the

17

owner was?

18

A

I don't remember.

19

Q

He could have done that, right?

20

A

Possibly.

21

Q

If he had done that, would you have called the person

22

before you called dispatch?

23

A

24

same time.

25

Q

I would have probably had dispatch do it all at the

All right, all at the same time.

But you don't
10

1
2
3
4
5

remember whether or not he even told you that, correct?
A

If he told me his first name and last name and phone

number?
Q

First name and phone number, not a last name but a

first name and phone number.

6

A

I don't remember.

7

Q

Okay.

8

Now, at that point in time you say you never

got the registration.

Did you ask for the registration?

9

A

Yeah.

10

Q

Did you look in the glove box for it?

11

A

He looked around.

12
13
14

He couldn't find no paperwork on

the car.
Q

You're sure about that.

Was paperwork found in the

vehicle?

15

A

No.

16

Q

Did you do the inventory search or did someone else?

17

A

Officer Grogen did.

18

Q

And you testified it was done according to Police

19

Department Policy and Procedures.

How do you know that?

20

A

'Cause Officer Grogen did it.

21

Q

Well, Officer Grogen did it, not you, correct?

22

A

Yeah.

23

Q

So you don't know if he followed policies and

24
25

procedures or not, do you?
A

Yeah, he did.

11

1

Q

How do you know that?

2

A

'Cause all you gotta do is fill out the paperwork

3

which he filled out the vehicle information and he gave it to

4

me —

5

Q

Where is the vehicle information?

6

A

It's with the case report.

7

Q

What vehicle information did he fill out?

8

A

It's the state tax slip on the top it will say For

9

Safe Keep.

10

Q

State tax slip and then is there another paper?

11

there also paperwork done by the Police Department Impound

12

Inventory sheet?

13
14

A

No.

It's all on the - that's it.

Is

It's on the stat

tax slip.

15

Q

Do you have a copy of the state tax slip?

16

A

No.

17

Q

That's suppose to go with the case report, right?

18

A

Yeah.

19

Q

And you're saying that's been filled out and

20

submitted?

21

A

Yes.

22

Q

And you're sure about that?

23

If I go to the police

department, that will be there today?

24

A

Yeah.

25

Q

Okay.

Now, you asked for Mr. Timmerman's driver's

1

license.

He provided you a Utah driver's license, correct?

2

A

Correct.

3

Q

And you verified he was the same person on there,

4

right?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

And then when you went back to your car, you took h

7

driver's license with you, correct?

8

A

Yes.

9

Q

So at that point in time, he wasn't free to go?

10

A

If he wanted to leave he wouldn't have his driver's

11
12
13

license.
Q

Yeah, and then you'd have pulled him over because h

didn't have a driver's license, right?

14

A

No.

15

Q

It's illegal to drive without a valid Utah driver's

16

license, correct?

17

A

Correct.

18

Q

And since you had it, he really couldn't leave,

19

correct?

20

A

He could have.

21

Q

Okay.

22

Now you ran warrant checks on him too,

correct?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Did you check on the car?

25

A

Yes.

1

Q

Did you do that before you ran a warrants check?

2

A

I had dispatch do it at the same time.

3

Q

And you determined there was a warrant issued by

4
5

Adult Parole and Probation, correct?
A

Yes.

6

MR. GRAVIS:

7

MR. PARMLEY:

8

THE COURT:

9

MR. PARMLEY:

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. GRAVIS:

13

THE COURT:

No other questions, Your Honor.
You may step down sir.

Thank you.

No, Your Honor.
Mr. Gravis?
Nothing, Your Honor.
Did you wish to address your case, Mr.

Parmley?

15
16

I have nothing further.

Anything else?

10

14

Okay.

MR. PARMLEY:

It's Mr. Gravis' motion so perhaps I

should —

17

MR. GRAVIS:

18

MR. PARMLEY:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. PARMLEY:

State's burden.
Then I would like to address it myself.
Okay.
I would agree with the defense's brief

21

that there would be a problem in this case if Officer Dixon's

22

initial approach to the defendant's truck constituted a

23

detention, level two encounter.

24

that, of course, is that Officer Dixon did not observe any

25

violation of the law when he first saw the defendant. However,

However - and the reason for

14

1

he did see what looked to him like somebody in distress at the

2

side of the road and they need help.

3

his vehicle over to the highway that the defendant was on and

4

drove to some distance behind the defendant and merely stopped

5

his patrol vehicle, did not activate his overhead lights or do

6

anything that would cause the person in the vehicle that he's

7

approaching to feel that they were being detained for a

8

violation of law.

9

simply walked up to the vehicle.

Officer Dixon then pulled

In fact, they were not.

Officer Dixon then

Now he had observed this

10

vehicle have Iowa plates but his purpose in walking up to the

11

vehicle was to see if he could help him, to find out what was

12

the matter with the truck, why he was stranded at the side of

13

the road and in the course of that, simply talked with him

14

about the problem he was having with the fuses, the lights had

15

gone out, asked him who the truck belonged to because he had

16

seen the Iowa plates, asked the defendant where he lived.

17

The defendant at that time told Officer Qixon that he

18

lived in Huntsville, didn't know who the truck owner was and

19

Officer Dixon at that point, was beginning to have some

20

suspicions about the registration and identity of the owner of

21

the vehicle.

22

the prudent thing and asked if there was registration papers

23

with the vehicle.

24

papers, then Officer Dixon had reasonable suspicion that there

25

was something wrong with the registration of the vehicle, that

And at that point, Your Honor, Officer Dixon did

When the defendant couldn't produce any

15

1

the defendant may not be a legitimate possessor of the vehicle

2

and at that point had a duty as a peace officer to confirm or

3

dispel his suspicions.

4

Now at that point, this did change to a level two

5

encounter and he asked the defendant if he could see his

6

driver's license and went back to his patrol vehicle where he

7

asked dispatch to run an NCI check on the vehicle, a driver's

8

license check for the defendant and a warrant's check for the

9

defendant and in the process, discovered that the vehicle was

10

not stolen, that the defendant did have a driver's license, but

11

there was a warrant for his arrest.

12

I don't think that Officer Dixon should have

13

proceeded any differently than he did once he had seen the Iowa

14

plates, heard some not particularly reasonable explanations

15

about what the defendant is doing in possession of the car

16

because he lives in Huntsville and doesn't know who the owner

17

is and has no papers for the vehicle.

18

no papers with the vehicle, itself constitutes a violation of

19

law that Officer Dixon had a duty to pursue.

20

Officer Dixon did through that point was absolutely as he

21

should have.

22

The facts th'at there are

So I think that

Once he had discovered the warrant of arrest, he was

23

duty bound as an officer of the law and an officer of the

24

courts to affect an arrest.

25

has the right to search the defendant incident to the arrest,

Once he's affected the arrest, he

16

1

his person and the passenger compartment of the vehicle.

2

did that.

3

Even if there had been a problem with the impound or inventory,

4

they had the right to have searched the passenger compartment

5

incident to arrest in any event.

6

the suspected controlled substance.

7

They

They also impounded and inventoried the vehicle.

They did that.

They found

The last part of the argument the defense makes is

8

that after Miranda, the defendant's statement to Officer Dixon

9

about the methamphetamine, that statement should be suppressed

10

because it was the product of coercion.

Under the law that the

11

Court consider the totality of the circumstances, I think that

12

it's apparent here that there was some appeal

13

to be cooperative and to be honest.

14

testimony is that he told the defendant that if it was his he

15

should tell me so that she didn't get charged for his stuff.

16

think those were his exact words, so that she didn't get

17

charged for his stuff.

18

conscience, but I don't think that under the totality of the

19

circumstances that's excessive, that it's offensive, that it's

20

egregious conduct on the part of the police that amounts to

21

coercive, unfair tactics to induce a person to admit something

22

that they would not otherwise have talked about.

23

simple appeal to cooperate with them and own up to it if it's

24

his so that she doesn't get blamed for it, at which point he

25

does make a somewhat incriminating statement and then it's

to

the

defendant

In fact, the Officer's

I

I think that's an appeal to one's

It was a very

17

1

after that, he says, no, I want to talk to my attorney.

2

Officer Dixon at that point cuts it off entirely and says,

3

Fine. Doesn't ask another question.

4

Officer Dixon cuts it off so quickly at that point, goes to

5

Officer Dixon's credit and shows that Officer Dixon is very

6

cognizant of the defendant's rights under Miranda.

7

respectful of the defendant's invocation of those rights when

8

it becomes clear the defendant doesn't want to talk.

9

before that, there's nothing more than a request for the

I think the fact that

He's also

But

10

defendant to cooperate and own up to something so that somebody

11

else doesn't take the fall for it if it really is his and the

12

defendant responds to that.

13

circumstances in this case, Your Honor, I don't think was

14

coercive.

We ask the Court to deny the Defendant's Motion to

15

Suppress.

Thank you.

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. GRAVIS:

That, under the totality of the

Mr. Garvis?
Yes, Your Honor.

First off, we feel

18

that it's a threat either you take ownership of it or we're

19

going to charge you both and we feel that's coercive.

20

two, the officer cannot say whether or not Mr. Timmerman told

21

him that the first name and phone number to check out who the

22

owner of the vehicle was, nor was there any evidence that the

23

registration - the State is assuming that the registration

24

under Iowa law has to be in the vehicle.

25

that before the Court.

Number

There's no proof of

Just because Utah requires it, Iowa may
18

1

not require it and I submit the Interstate Commerce Clause

2

means that a vehicle from Iowa, if you stop a vehicle from

3

Iowa, they're not required to have registration in the vehicle,

4

they cannot be in violation of Utah law.

5

argues that's a violation fo law, that's assuming facts not

6

into evidence.

7

So, when Mr. Parmley

The question is whether there's reasonable suspicion.

8

Mr. Timmerman told him his name, had a valid Utah driver's

9

license, told him where he lived, said he'd borrowed the

10

vehicle and may have told him that the person he borrowed the

11

vehicle from first name and telephone number.

12

can't remember whether he did or not.

13

reasonable suspicion and taking the totality of the

14

circumstances.

15

Mr. Timmerman was very cooperative, like I say, produced a

16

valid Utah driver's license.

17

he takes the driver's license and goes back to his vehicle with

18

it, that constitutes a detention.

19

that say when the officer has the driver's license and/or

20

registration that constitutes a level two stop. State vs.

21

Holmes, there's a whole series of that.

22

State would disagree that the case law is quite clear that at

23

the point the officer has that, there's a detention, a level

24

two stop.

25

we submit it's not.

The officer

We're looking at

The officer had no report of a stolen vehicle.

I would submit that at the point

There is numerous Utah cases

I don't think the

The question is whether or not it's reasonable and

19

1

The last issue is whether or not the warrant itself

2

is valid.

The warrant was issued by the Adult Parole and

3

Probation for parole violation.

4

violates both the Fourth Amendment of the United States

5

Constitution and Article I Section 14 of the Constitution of

6

Utah says, "For seizure of the individual was not based upon

7

probably cause submitted to a neutral magistrate".

8

in their memorandum has argued that under Article V the

9

Separation of Power Clause, it says the State, whatever powers

It is our position that

The State

10

- I'll get the exact wording here.

Article V, Section 1 of the

11

Constitution says, "Additionally Article V, Section 1 of the

12

Utah State Constitution allows for the exercise of powers

13

belonging to the three state departments of government when the

14

cases are here and expressly directed or permitted."

15

that if you go to Article VII Section 12 of the Utah

16

Constitution which provides the power of the Board of Pardons

17

and Paroles, it does not authorize them the power t'o issue

18

warrants for arrest.

19

power but the legislature is expressly restrained by the

20

Constitution, Separate of Powers.

21

but whether it's constitutional of not you have to go to the

22

Constitution.

23

the power to do that.

24

have the power to issue a warrant but that does not mean it's a

25

legal warrant since the Constitution of Utah does not, under

I submit

The legislature may have given them the

They can give them the power

The State says well, the legislature gave them
I agree.

It is in the statute that they

1

their powers, does not give them the power to issue warrants

2

and even if it did, the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution

3

clearly says all people, persons shall be - their property and

4

person shall be safe from unreasonable search and seizure

5

unless there's a warrant issued based upon probable cause

6

issued by neutral and detached magistrate.

7

can't overruled the United States Constitution and give the

8

parole department the power to issue warrants.

9

a parole Officer that picked him up, I would agree that the

Utah Legislature

Now, if it was

10

warrant would be valid for a parole officer but the case law in

11

Utah, a recent series of cases, talk about the difference

12

between the power of a parole officer and the power of a police

13

officer.

14

In State vs. Birmingham, 10P Third 355, the Court of

15

Appeals stated that according to the Vasquez case - and I would

16

submit that probationers and parolees are treated the same

17

although probationers have a diminished Fourth Amendment right

18

as to searches by probation officers.

19

police officers may engage in more of the search and seizures

20

as to probationers as the same basis as probation officers.

21

submit that police officers do not have the right to arrest on

22

a board warrant the same as a parole officer would have.

23

This does not mean

I

A general warrant issued must be issued by a neutral

24

and detached magistrate.

The determination of probable cause

25

is a core judicial function and to give that power to the Board
21

1

of Pardons to issue a general warrant not just to the parole

2

officer but to police officers, violates the Constitution,

3

violates the core judicial function of issuing a warrant.

4

There's no neutral and detached magistrate.

5

is appointed by the governor.

6

the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 14 of the

7

Constitution of Utah, prohibit the arrest on a warrant unless

8

it's been issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.

9

we'd submit that the warrant itself is invalid, therefore the

The parole board

They're not magistrates and both

So,

10

arrest is invalid and the search incident to arrest is invalid.

11

Thank you.

12

THE COURT:

Thank you.

13

Do you wish to respond Mr. Parmley?

14

MR. PARMLEY:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Just with

15

regard to the totality of circumstances giving the officer

16

reasonable suspicion to believe that something was awry, that a

17

crime may have been committed.

18

the defendant's somewhat evasive or unreasonable,

19

unsatisfactory explanations about what he was doing with the

20

car and who the owner was and in addition to the absence of

21

their being any paperwork with the vehicle, the activity of the

22

defendant when the officer pulled up, itself is suspicious and

23

gives the officer additional suspicion that this vehicle may be

24

stolen or improperly registered, that the defendant may not be

25

lawfully in possession of the vehicle.

In addition to the Iowa plates,

And that's that the car
22

1

is somewhat stranded on the side of the road, the door is open,

2

the defendant's got screwdriver or tools in there and is

3

tinkering with the fuse box.

4

kind of conduct that would be more likely associated with

5

somebody tampering with a vehicle that is not their own than it

6

is with an owner who is in lawful possession of their own

7

vehicle.

8
9

That all looks suspicious.

Now, as to the board warrant.

The

77-27-11 says that any

member of the board may issue a warrant based upon a certified

10

warrant request to a peace officer or other person authorized

11

to arrest, detain and return to actual custody, a parolee.

12

It's any peace officer.

13

wouldn't include a regular peace officer.

14

an AP&P agent but that doesn't seem to be the way it reads at

15

all.

16

or detain.

17

officer like an Ogden police uniform officer or patrol officer.

18

The defense has argued that well, it
It would have to be

It's a peace officer or other person authorized to arrest
That includes, of course, any category one peace

Now as to the Constitutional argument.

It's

19

suggested that because the legislature has enacted this

20

provision, doesn't make any difference because it seems

21

inconsistent with the Constitution.

22

be that the legislative provision allowing the board to issue a

23

warrant is unconstitutional?

24

that this provision is unconstitutional?

25

legislature has enacted that kind of provision and an officer

But wouldn't the challenge

Wouldn't that be the argument
It seems that if the

23

1

acts under that order or mandate that the statute is imposed,

2

that the arrest is nonetheless unlawful for purposes of what

3

he's doing and for purposes of his executing the search

4

incident to arrest.

5

The Legislature has also declared that a peace

6

officer can arrest on probably cause without any kind of

7

warrant at all and when a peace officer arrests on probable

8

cause without any kind of warrant at all, he can do a search

9

incident to arrest as well.

It strikes me that the legislature

10

has enacted the provision.

11

- it gives the board the authority to issue the warrant.

12

gives the officer the duty to arrest on the warrant and at that

13

point the officer, acting in good faith and arresting on the

14

warrant, conducts the search incident to arrest as he should

15

and that a challenge to the Constitutionality of the

16

legislative grant of authority wouldn't go to the issue of

17

whether the evidence should be suppressed in any event but to a

18

Constitutional challenge of a statute that is in effect on the

19

law, on the books and this officer was simply complying with

20

the laws as they stand in the State of Utah.

21

Court to deny the motion.

22

MR. GRAVIS:

It gives the officer the authority
It

Again, we ask the

Thank you.

In response, the officer testified he

23

had no reasonable suspicion based upon what the defendant was

24

doing out tinkering with the fuse box.

25

THE COURT:

I didn't say you are entitled to a
24

1

response.

2

MR. GRAVIS:

Your Honor, I believe I am.

This is not

3

beyond a reasonable doubt, burden of proof.

4

up new issues in his response that I'd like to respond to.

5

is not rebuttal.

THE COURT:

7

MR. GRAVIS:

8

THE COURT:

10

I don't see any new issue.
He brought up - he started arguing the—
Just a moment Mr. Gravis.

I'll be frank.

At this stage, the only concern I have is the Constitutional
argument.

11
12

It

It is new issues.

6

9

Besides he brought

The rest of it, that's of no consequence.
MR. GRAVIS:

Okay.

Then I'd like to address his

argument that he just made on the Constitutional argument.

13

THE COURT:

But you raised the argument of the

14

Constitutional argument.

15

say.

16

MR. GRAVIS:

17

THE COURT:

He was responding to what you had to

But I still I'll allow you to do it briefly Mr.

18

Gravis, but you understand I'm doing it as a matter of my

19

discretion allowing you to do it, not because you have a right

20

to do it.

21

MR. GRAVIS:

I'll take it for that, yes, Your Honor

22

and I'll do it very briefly.

Number one, our argument that the

23

warrant was illegal addresses that the statute is

24

unconstitutional.

25

warrant is illegal.

Because the statute is unconstitutional, the

25

1

Number two, good faith does not come into play.

2

Number one, under Utah Supreme Court has not adopted United

3

States vs. Leon under Article I Section 14 argument.

4

two, even if Leon was adopted, or we are on the Fourth

5

Amendment argument, good faith only applies if the warrant is

6

issued by a neutral and detached magistrate.

7

didn't happen so there's no good faith argument here.

8

statute is unconstitutional, they cannot save it on a good

9

faith argument.

10

Number

In this case it
If the

Thank you.

THE COURT:

Okay.

Interesting.

So you don't think

11

you could extend Leon, assuming that the Utah Supreme Court

12

would go with it, and I agree with your analysis, I'm not aware

13

of any case where the Supreme Court has adopted the Leon

14

doctrine.

15

present composition of the court, it would be likely they

16

would.

17
18
19

Although to be candid, I think considering the

MR. GRAVIS:

Yes.

The prior composition we may not

have.
THE COURT:

That's true.

With Mr. Zimmerman gone, I

20

think it's almost a foregone conclusion.

21

that the good faith of the officer wouldn't have application

22

because of the fact that it wasn't issued by a magistrate?

23

MR. GRAVIS:

But you feel like

Well, Your Honor, specifically sets

24

forth four factors and one of them is that the magistrate was

25

not neutral and detached.

I would submit that if -

26

1
2
3

THE COURT:

You don't think that they would extend

beyond that to cover that inevitability?

Okay.

Interesting.

I'm going to take the Motion to Suppress under

4

advisement.

I guess I need to go back and read this and see if

5

I feel like the language (inaudible) to cover - because I think

6

it's clear in this case, Mr. Parmley, that the officer was

7

acting in good faith in enforcing the warrant.

8

that he would have been able to distinguish the nature of the

9

warrant to begin with.

10

MR. PARMLEY:

I'm not sure

So as I understand it, the two issues

11

the Court is still looking at are one, whether the statutory

12

provision giving the Board authority to issue a warrant is

13

unconstitutional?

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. PARMLEY:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. PARMLEY:

18
19

Right.
Two, if it is unconstitutional, does—
If Leon is applied-it nullify the arrest and the

subsequent search?
THE COURT:

Right.

From the standpoint of his

20

investigative process, his stop, his conversations with the

21

defendant, his warrants check and so forth, I find that

22

immanently reasonable.

23

what the law requires of him but that would certainly not grant

24

- that would not constitute any kind of grounds for suppression

25

of the evidence.

I think he did his job.

I think he did

27

1

The only issue relates to the constitutionality of

2

the issuance of the warrant in the first place and the second

3

place, at least the application to nis making the arrest as

4

opposed to a parole officer. And secondly, whether the good

5

faith doctrine of Leon would have application.

6

Where are we on the case?

7

MR. GRAVIS:

We don't have a trial setting.

We set

8

this for suppression hearing and probably - why don't we go

9

ahead and set a trial and the pre-trial and your decision as

10

soon as possible.

11

Two week pretrial.

THE COURT:

Yeah, let's do that.

12

set the case back on the calendar.

13

trial now or should be set it for pretrial?

14

MR. PARMLEY:

15

THE COURT:

16

MR. PARMLEY:

17

THE COURT:

18

Let's go ahead and

Would you like to set a

Let's go ahead and set the trial now.
Pardon me?
Let's go ahead and set the trial now.
Okay.

How much time are we going to

need?

19

MR. GRAVIS:

The reason we didn't set a trial on this

20

is basically we've talked to Mr. Parmley, he wanted to put this

21

(inaudible) before he even decided whether or not it would

22

(inaudible) the suppression.

23

We just set the suppression hearing date.

24
25

THE COURT:

So we didn't set a trial date.

How about the 20th of November for a

trial?
28

1

MR. GRAVIS:

2

THE COURT:

3

That would be fine.
Would that work for the State, Mr.

Parmley?

4

MR. PARMLEY:

5

THE COURT:

It should.

And then put it back on both for decision

6

on the motion under advisement and pretrial on say November 5th

7

and I may very well have decided it before then.

8
9

MR. PARMLEY:

Why don't we set it on the 29th. That's

two weeks.

10

THE COURT:

That would be fine.

Okay.

11

MR. GRAVIS:

2:00 on that?

12

THE COURT:

Yeah, 2:00 P.M.

13

MR. GRAVIS:

14

THE COURT:

15

(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)

Thank you, Your Honor.
Thank you.

16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

(C)
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Judge Stanton M. Taylor

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

State of Utah,

)
)

Petitioner,
vs.

Brent W. Timmerman,

)
)
)

Memorandum Decision

)

Case No. 011903622

)
)

Respondent

)

The defendant has filed a motion to suppress evidence seized by an officer after
the officer had observed the defendant pulled over to the side of the road on the ramp onto the
freeway off 24th Sreet. in Ogden.
The officer stopped to see if the defendant needed assistance. Ultimately, because
of an out-of-state vehicle being driven by an instate driver who was unable to give the full name
of the owner of the vehicle, the officer did a license and warrant check on the defendant. The
check revealed a current Board of Pardons Warrant. A subsequent search of the vehicle, based
both upon the arrest and an inventory required when impounding a vehicle, revealed the
contraband out of which these charges arose.
The Court finds factually the conduct of the officer during the incident was both
professionally responsible and constitutionally permissible. The only issue of note and the
reason I took the motion under advisement relates to whether the legislative grant of power to a
police officer to serve warrants issued by the Board of Pardons is violative of the constitution of
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both Utah and the United States.
It is clear that the Appellate Court of this state has upheld grants of power to both
the Courts and the Board of Pardons to issue warrants. It is just as clear that the basis for the
issuance of warrants differs between the two groups. The powers of the Courts and the Board are
separate and distinctive and not violative of the constitutional separation required.
The fact that the legislature has chosen—in its enumeration of powers of peace
officers—to allow them to serve both types of warrants is not violative of their discretion. Arrest
is an executive function in either situation and would not contravene constitutional strictures.
Even assuming problems relating to the constitutional issues raised above, I
would find the officer was relying reasonably upon the validity of the warrant issued and refuse
to suppress based upon "Leon" and its progeny.
For the reasons stated, the motion to suppress is hereby denied.

DATED this

\% day of October, 2001.

Stanton M. T^loryDistrict Judge
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